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Empirical psychological research is proliferating on deception detection in the context of
interviews, interrogation, conversation, written narratives, and extemporaneous and
formal remarks. There are several presumptions behind this research. One is that
there is a discrete psychological phenomenon, viz., the intention to maintain, create, or
influence some sort of misperception in one or more people, that can be systematically
studied (1). Another is that there are indicators causing or correlated with the
phenomenon that can be reliably and validly identified (2). Yet another is that there are
communication tactics and strategies that can make the identification of these indicators
easier or more difficult (3). These tactics and strategies can be employed not only by
anyone seeking to deceive but also to tell the truth, e.g., both interrogator and
interrogatee. Although research continues to yield generalizations supporting these
presumptions, the magic bullets and litmus tests of knowledge that can ensure accurate
determinations with specific people in specific situations have not been and may not be
identified (4).
This shortfall also characterizes deception attempts employed in strategic
counterintelligence operations. These operations are initiated by representatives of
countries, governments, non-government organizations, and transnational groups.
These representatives seek to influence the collection, analysis, clandestine/covert
operations, and counterintelligence capabilities of targets such as adversaries, neutrals,
and even allies. The intent of the initiator is to develop, maintain, or otherwise influence
a misperception in the target leading to behavior supportive of the initiator’s strategic
goals and detrimental to or less supportive of the strategic goals of the target.
Examples abound. The target collects the wrong information; comes to inaccurate
interpretations of the right information; launches clandestine/covert operations that are
likely to achieve the wrong ends; tactical counterintelligence resources will be dedicated
to the wrong threat or the right threat with the wrong combination of resources. The
very strategic goals of the target may be conceived by the target in a manner
detrimental to the target’s military, political, economic, and socio-cultural viability.
But there are complications. At the very moment the initiator is planning against the
target, the target is planning against the initiator. The very deception attempted by the
initiator is actually desired by the target, because it fits into a larger deception intended
by the target against the initiator. So, the initiator is also a target, the target also an
initiator.
And on the global stage there is a third actor, the observer, watching what’s happening
between initiator and target. Watching what works and what doesn’t to be used in
deception attempts against initiator and target sometime in the future. Yet pure
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observation is unlikely in that the observer concurrently may be an initiator and/or target
in relation to the initiator and target being observed. We’re left with a triadic conception
of the world of strategic counterintelligence, and one that is hyper-dimensional and
characterized as a hyperreality. The former denotes the same actor on the global stage
becoming and being an initiator, target, and observer at any moment in the present,
past, and future. The latter denotes the consequence of the hyper-dimensional and is
best described by the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard--an inability of to differentiate
reality from a simulation of reality, especially in societies characterized by technological
change and cultural skepticism as to the nature of truth. A recently published article on
triadic influence attempts supports at least some of the above analysis (6).
A conclusion might be that empirical psychological research can only take us so far
without the interpretive and narrative approaches to meaning and knowledge from
historiography, hermeneutics, exegesis, and literary criticism (7). Just as the Dutch
philosopher Desiderius Erasmus noted that in the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed
man is king (8), in the world of deception the American director Stanley Kubrick noted
that our eyes are wide shut (9).
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